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I. CURRENT INFRINGEMENT ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Attacks on individual freedom of choice and association in the name
of "equality" and "brotherhood" have proceeded apace in the last half
dozen years. Never has such a concerted effort been made to force to-
gether those whom individual inclination have put asunder. The dismal
record is worth some re-examination.
High on the list must come the assaults on fraternities and sororities.
As early as 1954 it was held constitutional for New York State's uni-
versity to ban social organizations which discriminated based on race,
creed, or color.' In 1957 the University of Massachusetts ruled that no
new fraternities or sororities would be permitted which did not accept
students because of race, color, or creed, and that local chapters of
established or national groups which had restrictive membership would
be eliminated unless the restrictions were lifted within three years.2
California University regents followed suit in 1959.'
Other fraternities and sororities which faced reprisal because of re-
strictive membership have been located at the University of Iowa,4 Wes-
leyan University,5 Dartmouth College,6 University of Wisconsin,7 Wil-
* B.A. 1954, Hunter College; LL.B. 1956, Columbia University; LL.M. 1957, New York
University; M.L. 1961, J.S.D. 1962, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1965 (University of
Cambridge, England). Member of the New York, Florida, District of Columbia, Illinois,
and U.S. Supreme Court Bars. Professor of Law, Memphis State University; former Special
Deputy Attorney-General of New York; sometime Special Counsel, Attorney-General of
Louisiana; sometime Special Counsel, Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government.
1. Webb v. State University, 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348
U.S. 867 (1954).
2. Statement of Trustees and Administration of University of Massachusetts, 2 RACE
REL. L. REP. 510 (1957).
3. Regents of the University of California, Statement on Student Organizations and
Housing, 4 RACE REL L. R. 803 (1959); 5 CA.I. ADM. CODE, EDUCATION, § 954.6 (1959),
reprinted in 5 RACE REL. L. R. 537 (1960); Statement of the University of California, 8
RACE REL. L. R. 1245 (1963). See also N. Y. Times, July 19, 1959, at 9, col. 7.
4. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1960, at 16, col. 6.
5. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1959, at 24, col. 3.
6. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1960, at 88, col. 7; id., April 18, 1960, at 20, col. 4.
7. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1960, at 38, col. 1; id., Nov. 12, 1961, at 16, col. 4; id., Sept. 23,
1962, at 8, col. 8; id., Feb. 10, 1966, at 17, col. 3.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
liams College,8 Wayne State University,9 Stanford University, 10 Lake
Forest College," Yale University, 2 Rutgers University," Cornell Uni-
versity,'4 Bowdoin College,' 5 and The University of Illinois.' Northwest-
ern University, while conceding the right of fraternities and sororities to
choose their own members, took action against local chapters of national
organizations which restricted membership based on race, religion, or eth-
nic origin, so that these chapters would not be bound by national restric-
tions.' In spite of the clear evidence that many students support such
restrictions, 8 as well as fraternity officials generally, 9 college administra-
tors in many schools seem determined to enforce restrictions on dis-
crimination.2"
College students have not been alone in being the subject of anti-
discrimination drives. In 1959, a private tennis club in New York City
was the subject of a lengthy investigation by city officials for allegedly
excluding Ralph J. Bunche, Under Secretary of the United Nations, on
racial grounds.2 ' A long dispute about the "40 and 8", an American
Legion "fun and frolic" subsidiary, because it would only accept white
members,22 finally resulted in a court action in which a California judge
refused to permit the national group to revoke the charter of a local
chapter for accepting a Chinese-American as a member, or to charter
an all-white chapter, telling the members to read the United States
Constitution.2 3
In California,24 Connecticut," New Jersey,2" and New York,27 pri-
8. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1960, at 35, col. 2; id., Dec. 23, 1960, at 40, col. 1.
9. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1960, at 5, col. 5
10. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1961, at 17, col. 1; id., March 8, 1961, at 23, col. 1; id., March
9, 1961, at 23, col. 1.
11. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1961, at 4, col. 3; id., Oct. 1, 1961, at 84, col. 5; id., Oct. 29,
1961, at 51, col. 1.
12. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1961, at 36, col. 2.
13. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1964, at 25, col. 1.
14. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1966, at 38, col. 6.
15. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1966, at 14, col. 1.
16. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1965, at 8, col. 5.
17. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1961, at 47, col. 1.
18. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1962, at 11, col. 8, reporting a poll at the University of
Michigan, in which 57 per cent of fraternity members favored religious restrictions.
19. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1960, at 34, col. 2; id., Dec. 2, 1961, at 25, col. 1.
20. See N.Y. Times, April 10, 1960, at 24, col. 3.
21. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1959, at 1, col. 4; id., July 12, 1959, at 62, col. 3; id., July 15,
1959, at 1, col. 3; id., July 16, 1959, at 29, col. 8; id., July 18, 1959, at 1, col. 4; id., July 22,
1959, at 17, col. 2.
22. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1959, at 18, col. 6; id., Dec. 1, 1959, at 23, col. 3; id., Dec. 7,
1959, at 30, col. 1 (editorial) ; id., June 10, 1960, at 37, col. 6; id., Oct. 19, 1960, at 38, col. 1;
id., Oct. 20, 1960, at 10, col. 5.
23. N.Y. Post, Oct. 2, 1959, at 40, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, July 28, 1959, at 19, col. 1.
24. Attorney-General of California Ruling, 5 RACE REL. L. R. 906 (1960) ; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 4, 1963, at 26, col. 4.
25. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1961, at 19, col. 6; id., Aug. 27, 1964, at 37, col. 8.
26. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1961, at 43, col. 3; id., Sept. 20, 1961, at 31, col. 1.
27. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1960, at 35, col. 1.
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vate golf clubs have been banned from using municipal golf courses be-
cause they would not accept Negro members. A yacht club in Chicago
was barred from public facilities for the same reason. 28 A Protestant
Episcopal minister went so far as to bar from communion any of his
parishioners who had sanctioned the exclusion of a convert from Judaism
from a country club Christmas dance.29
Another tactic used to pressure private clubs has been well pub-
licized resignations and attacks on them by high public officials. Attorney-
General Robert F. Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of Labor George C.
Lodge, Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, Ambassador to India
John K. Galbraith, and Mayor Robert F. Wagner of New York City
have been among such officials. These resignations have not been mere
private protests, but have been used as public sounding boards."0 Even
the very "liberal" New York Times conceded the right of these clubs to
discriminate as they saw fit,3 and suggested that political profit rather
than intellectual piety produced the sudden flurry of self-righteous with-
drawals. 2 Public officials have also been told not to appear at functions
where Negroes were barred. 3
Attacks on private clubs have not spared those of tender age. A New
Jersey municipal human relations commission investigated a local Girl
Scout and Brownie group to uncover discrimination.34 A spelling bee was
also the subject of charges of excluding Negroes. 5 Nor does a gratuitous
and public-spirited service to the community by a private organization
carry any guarantee of exemption from molestation on account of ad-
mission policies. Thus in the New York City suburbs, volunteer fire com-
28. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1962, at 25, col. 1.
29. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1961, at 1, col. 4.
30. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1961, at 1, col. 2; id., May 1, 1961, at 28, col. 1 (editorial)
id., May 17, 1961, at 23, col. 4; id., Sept. 21, 1961, at 22, col. 1; id., Jan. 15, 1962, at 12,
col. 4; id., Jan. 16, 1962, at 32, col. 6 (Arthur Krock) ; id., Jan. 17, 1962, at 15, col. 1; id.,
Jan. 18, 1962, at 14, col. 2; id., Feb. 10, 1962, at 1, col. 2; id., Feb. 15, 1962, at 20, col. 5.
31. See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1961, at 28, col. 1 (editorial):
Mr. Goldberg was critical of a Washington club which, he believes, excludes some
foreign diplomats because of their color. The club loses some good company on this
account, as does any similar organization which shuts people out for bad and foolish
reasons. But we cannot pass laws requiring private clubs to take in all who apply.
32. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1962, at 32, col. 2 (editorial):
We are not impressed by the parade of ostentatious resignations of political figures
from private clubs on the sudden discovery that these clubs practice racial or
religious discrimination in choosing members ... when everyone else has known that
the same clubs have practiced the same discrimination for years. It is just possible
that some grand-standing for political purposes may be involved.
We have nothing but contempt for the policy of a club that automatically refuses
acceptance to a man because of his race or religion. But we suppose that even the
contemptible, who consciously and deliberately advocate bigotry, have their right
under the Constitution of a free country to form clubs in which they associate only
with their chosen peers.
33. See N.Y. Times, April 28, 1961, at 19, col. 3; id., Nov. 10, 1961, at 26, col. 3.
34. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1965, at 10, col. 5; id., Dec. 8, 1965, at 20, col. 8; id., Jan. 6,
1966, at 24, col. 7.
35. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1962, at 20, col. 5.
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panies, which save the taxpayers thousands of dollars by substituting for
a paid fire department, have recently been under attack for excluding
Negroes as members.36 Ironically, the public service which these orga-
nizations render to the community, by being on call to fight fires, day
and night, without pay, has been turned against them, and lawsuits have
been brought to compel them to admit Negro members on the theory
that they are governmental agencies.3 7
Attacks on the right of private organizations to choose their mem-
bership as they themselves decide show no signs of abating. In an ag-
gravated incident, a Wisconsin judge was picketed at his home by mas-
sive groups of Negro demonstrators and white sympathizers to force
him to withdraw from a fraternal order open only to white persons.3 8
N.A.A.C.P. youth officials promised to extend similar demonstrations
throughout the Midwest. 9 The New York City Human Rights Commis-
sion recently took jurisdiction of a complaint by a white physician that
he was denied membership in a Negro medical society, and issued sub-
poenas requiring the society's officers to appear and testify.4 °
The Virgin Islands has probably gone further than any other juris-
diction in infringing on freedom of choice in organizations. It bans racial
or religious discrimination by any private club which makes a charge
for food, drink, or anything else, or has a swimming pool or other facil-
ity.4 Apparently, if a bridge foursome should meet regularly, and the
members should "chip in" for a bottle of soda water, it would be illegal
for the group to discriminate based on race or religion. Lest it be thought
that government would never reach down so far, it might be noted that
complaints of discrimination have recently been aired against bridge
clubs, even though it appears that Negroes and white persons prefer to
stay in segregated clubs even where desegregation has occurred, because
"they find greater 'camaraderie' " in their own groups.42
36. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1962, at 20, col. 4; id., March 6, 1966, at 74, col. 3; id., March
9, 1966, at 24, col. 5; id., March 23, 1966, at 31, col. 4. See also id., March 19, 1966, at 28,
col. 1 (editorial).
37. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1966, at 31, col. 4; id., April 16, 1966, at 35, col. 8; id., June
8, 1966, at 92, col. 8. See Everett v. Riverside Hose Co., 261 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
For pressure to end discrimination in volunteer fire departments, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1967 at 90, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1967, at 31, col. 2. A recently enacted statute in
New York now prohibits such discrimination. See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1967, at 33, col. 1.
38. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1966, at 31, col. 3, at 40, col. 5 (Arthur Krock) ; id., Sept. 1,
1966, at 39, col. 2; id., Sept. 2, 1966, at 40, col. 4; id., Sept. 5, 1966, at 9, col. 1; id., Sept. 6,
1966, at 46, col. 5 (Arthur Krock). See also id., March 6, 1966, at 95, col. 1.
39. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1966, at 40, col. 4.
40. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1965, at 36, col. 4; id., Nov. 20, 1965, at 21, col. 7. Baltimore
Equal Opportunity Commission Regulation, 8 RACE REL. L. R. 280 (1963), provides:
No employer or labor union . . . shall make any differentiation among employees
or members on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry with
respect to attendance at, or participation in, social events which are directly or
indirectly sponsored by the employer or labor union for the benefit of employees
or members.
41. 10 VIRoIN ISLANDS CODE, §§ 2, 3 (1957). See also N.Y. Times, May 7, 1961, at 130,
col. 3; id., May 29, 1961, at 3, col. 4.
42. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1965, at 55, col. 1.
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Are discriminatory clubs violating the rights of rejected applicants?
This article will explore what the courts have thought about this subject
to see whether current attacks on organizational freedom of choice can
be deemed justified from a legal point of view.
II. SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
The earliest cases to deal with admission to organizations of a social
nature involved membership in religious organizations. Authority is now
uniform that courts will not interfere with admission to religious groups
of any kind.43 A New Hampshire case ruled:
The action of the society, in refusing to admit some of the plain-
tiffs to membership, cannot be controlled or restrained by an
injunction of the court. The right of admission to membership
is voluntary and mutual between the society and individuals
desiring to become members. No one can be compelled to join
the society or remain a member in it against his wish, nor can the
society be compelled to admit any one against its will, fairly
expressed at a regular meeting by a majority vote. This principle
is inherent in every voluntary association.44
Fraternal organizations may likewise exclude whomever they choose,
even on the most arbitrary grounds.45 The chief attraction of such a
group may be "snob appeal," and arbitrary exclusions may be in reality
the sum and substance of the group. Exclusion of Negroes was justified
on this ground alone in one case.46 Courts may not interfere with mem-
43. Kubilius v. Hawes Unitarian Congregation Church, 322 Mass. 638, 79 N.E.2d 5
(1948) ; Taylor v. Edson, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 522 (1849) ; Henson v. Payne, 302 S.W.2d 44
(Mo. App. 1956); Taylor v. New York Annual Conf., 115 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1952); Western
Conf. of Original Free Will Baptists v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 123 S.E.2d 619 (1962).
44. Richardson v. Union Congregation, 58 N.H. 187, 189 (1877). In First Parish in Sud-
bury v. Stearns, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 148, 153 (1838), the court held:
No person can be made or become a member of any such corporation, without his
consent . . . . So on the other hand no person can thrust himself into any such
body against its will. The authority to prescribe the mode of admitting members,
necessarily implies the power of determining whether they shall be admitted or not.
This power may be exercised by a direct vote of the parish, or by proper by-laws be
delegated to a committee or certain officers of the society. The relation of a member
to a parish is founded on contract; and can be created in no way but by the agree-
ment of the parties.
45. Most Worshipful Widows' Sons Grand Lodge v. Most Worshipful Prince Hall
Grand Lodge, 160 Pa. Super. 595, 52 A.2d 333 (1947). In Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J.
Super. 247, 260, 123 A.2d 30, 37 (1956), the court observed:
[Tihere is no 'abstract right' to be admitted to membership in a voluntary associa-
tion . . . and a court will not compel the admission of a person to membership in
such an organization who has not been elected according to its rules and by-laws ....
The general rule is that there is no legal remedy for exclusion no . . . matter how
arbitrary or unjust the exclusion.
In Grand Lodge Order v. Schuetze, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 539, 550, 83 S.W. 241, 247 (1904),
the court said: "It was the legal right of the members composing that body, and of the
grand lodge and its officers, not to invite her to its membership, regardless of the motives
by which they were actuated .... "
46. Burrell v. Michaux, 273 S.W. 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), afl'd, 286 S.W. 176 (Tex.
1926), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom, Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order v. Michaux, 279
U.S. 737 (1929), the highest court in Texas noted:
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bership restrictions by social clubs, although these, too, may be wholly
capricious." One club was allowed to restrict its membership to men, al-
though it appears that exclusion of women was wholly arbitrary.48
The fact that a group has a common tie, interest, or activity, which
might serve as the basis for a reasonable set of qualifications for admis-
sion, does not disable the organization from selecting its members with-
out regard to these standards,49 even when the group owns valuable
property." Thus, literary clubs or historical societies may admit whom
they like, and need not confine their examination of the candidate for
membership to his intellectual attainments." It has been held that a
club of university women need not admit Negroes to membership. 2 An
athletic association may bar competent athletes from its events, even
when they are world-renown.13 The courts cannot review the refusal of
a Y.M.C.A. or Y.W.C.A. to admit a person to membership.54 Even the
We refer to the right of the complainants to maintain their order with that degree
of exclusiveness as will limit its membership, not only to Masons of high standing,
but to white persons only. It cannot be denied that one of the chief values, and one
of the strongly attractive features, of complainants' order consists in the fact that
none but white males are entitled to its benefits. In thus restricting the rights of
membership, the order has violated no legal right of any person excluded. It is not
a question of ethics or moral or religious rights, or even of race discrimination.
Nor yet is there any question of equal protection of law involved. The principle is
precisely the same as though a society was organized limiting its membership by
high tests of learning, skill, or the like. Clearly, the right to maintain such high
standards of membership, followed by the consequent honors incident thereto, would
be a valuable right capable of protection through the courts . . . . The rule would
be the same if the facts were reversed and the negroes were complaining.
286 S.W. at 181.
47. Stewart v. Monongahela Valley Country Club, 177 Pa. Super. 632, 112 A.2d 444
(1955). In Sebastian v. Quarter Century Club, 327 Mass. 178, 179, 97 N.E.2d 412, 413
(1951), the court said: "The rule is that an organization, whether incorporated or not . . .
is not required to admit to membership every qualified person who makes application . .. .
In Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 199, 162 A.2d 324, 332
(1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), the Superior Court of New Jersey pointed
out:
Many authorities cited by the defendant society deal with fraternal and social
organizations, emphasizing with great particularity that in organizations of such
character the right of election and selection of membership has been reserved to
them as a matter of law. It is well settled that in this latter class of organizations
membership may be increased or decreased at will, without regard to standards,
arbitrariness or otherwise, and without judicial interference.
48. Espinola v. Club Liberdade, Inc., 327 Mass. 24, 97 N.E.2d 202 (1951)
49. See People v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n, 41 Hun. 439, 3 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 142 (1886).
50. Evans v. Southside Place Park Ass'n, 154 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). But see
Lackey v. Sacoolas, 411 Pa. 235, 191 A.2d 395 (1963).
51. State v. Sibley, 25 Minn. 387 (1879) ; Jeffersonian Club v. Waugh, 217 S.W.2d 103
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Manning v. San Antonio Club, 63 Tex. 166 (1884).
52. Washington Branch v. American Ass'n of Univ. Women, 79 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C.
1948), aff'd, 85 D.C. Cir. 163, 175 F.2d 368 (1949).
53. Gray v. Ferris, 230 App. Div. 416, 245 N.Y. Supp. 230 (1930).
54. In Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 569, 72 A.2d 371, 377 (1950), the court
declared:
Counsel for the defendants argue that a voluntary association may require such
qualifications for membership and such formalities of election as it may choose and
that it may limit or restrict its membership to the original organizers or any other
limited number, and cites numerous cases as authority.
It must be admitted that the proposition advanced by defendants is a correct
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American Legion, if it arbitrarily refuses to admit a person to member-
ship, is immune from judicial examination.5
It has been held that even groups of a civic or political nature can
choose their members as they like.56 In McKane v. Adams,57 the New
York Supreme Court declared:
The defendants have the right to associate themselves, for
political purposes, with whom they will; and any number of
them may, at any time, decline to act longer with persons ob-
jectionable to them. The court cannot compel the defendants to
attend a meeting with the plaintiff, nor restrain the defendants
from meeting by themselves, or with others, for political ob-
jects."'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed, saying:
And if they would and will not associate with him, upon what
reasoning or principle should they be compelled-to, and the aid
of a court of justice invoked? ... It is by reason of the action,
and of the assent of the members of the voluntary association,
that one becomes associated with them in the common undertak-
ing, and not by any outside agency, or by the individual's action.
Membership is a privilege which may be accorded or withheld,
and not a right which can be gained independently, and then
enforced. So when ... the committee refused to admit him as
a member, or to confirm his election, he was remediless against
that refusal 9
exposition of the law. It must also be conceded that the court has no jurisdiction
to compel the admission of a person to membership in a voluntary organization
who has not been elected according to its rules and by-laws. The court does not
exercise visitorial powers over a voluntary association ....
55. In Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 556, 14 So.2d 225, 228 (1943), the
court quoted 7 C.J.S. Associations § 23 (1937) and
The grant or refusal of membership in a voluntary association is a matter within
the complete control of the organization, which has the power to enact laws
governing the admission of members, and to place restrictions on the right of
admission.
In other words, membership is a privilege which the society may accord or withhold
at its pleasure, and a court of equity will not interfere to compel the admission of a
person not regularly elected, even though the arbitrary rejection of the candidate
may prejudice his material interests ....
56. Robinson v. Holman, 181 Ark. 428, 26 S.W.2d 66 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 804
(1930) ; State ex rel. Baumhoff v. Taxpayer's League, 87 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App. 1935).
57. 51 Hun. 629, 4 N.Y. Supp. 401 (1889).
58. Id. at 402.
59. McKane v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 123 N.Y. 609, 25 N.E. 1057 (1890). The court
also said:
We have in such an association what we must assume to be the voluntary organ-
ization of citizens, moved only by patriotic considerations in an endeavor to
strengthen their party, and to promote its interests by organized and systematic
work. . . . How can it be said that in such work anything like a contract relation
subsists, or that there can be any obligation confining the free exercise of the
personal rights of citizens? Shall they not be free to reject as an associate, or as
an officer of their association, one whose character, aims, or record may, in their
judgment, fall below the standard of loyalty or of integrity demanded- by the work
in which they are engaged, or who, for any cause satisfactory to their minds, is
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The fact that the private organization uses government facilities
should not make any difference. Accordingly, it has been held that a pri-
vate club does not violate the Fifth Amendment by being racially exclu-
sive even if it receives some government aid.6° The Constitution protects
individuals against action by the government, federal, state, and local.
It does not give individuals the right to associate with other individuals
without the consent of the latter, and that consent may be withheld for
reasons which the government could not give. The New York Supreme
Court has pointed out:
The argument on constitutional, as distinguished from statutory,
grounds is that the exclusion of a member from the American
Legion because of his political opinions would constitute an in-
vasion of the rights of free speech guaranteed by federal and
state constitutional provisions.... Such constitutional provisions
protect the individual against action by governmental authori-
ties; they do not give the individual a right to insist on mem-
bership in a private association, to whose members his views,
whether or not denominated political, may be obnoxious.6 '
The authorities are therefore uniform that exclusion from a social
organization, even on arbitrary grounds, does not violate the rights of
anyone. There is no legal wrong to be redressed by such exclusion.
III. PROFESSIONAL GROUPS GENERALLY
It is a well settled rule that professional associations have an unfet-
tered right to restrict their membership as they like. For example, it has
been held that a bar association may refuse to admit whomever it cares
to exclude, 2 and the power of a bar association to exclude Negro lawyers
has been ruled upon, against the applicant.63 Likewise, an educational
association cannot be compelled to admit members against its will.64 In
a case involving music composers a federal court said:
unfit for the position of leadership he demands to occupy? Surely such propositions
would seem to contain their own refutation.
Id. at 1058.
60. Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957). But
see Opinion of the Attorney General of California, 4 RACE REL. L. R. 493 (1959) ; Horowitz,
Discriminatory Fraternities at State Universities, 25 So. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1952).
61. Reiter v. American Legion, 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345, 349 (1947), aff'd, 273
App. Div. 757, 75 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1947).
62. State ex rel. Cotonio v. Louisiana Bar Ass'n, 111 La. 967, 968, 36 So. 50, 51 (1904)
held: "Courts have no jurisdiction to compel the admission of a person, not elected according
to its rules and by-laws, to membership in a voluntary association . ... "
63. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Bar Ass'n, 197 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Goshorn
v. Bar Ass'n, 152 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1957).
64. North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n, 23 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ill. 1938), aff'd, 99
F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938), where the district court said:
In churches, lodges, and all other like voluntary associations each person, on
becoming a member, either by express stipulation or by implication, agrees to abide
by all rules and regulations adopted by the organization . . . . Consequently, such
an organization is the judge of its own members, and membership therein is a
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I find that ASCAP is a private association; that its rules and
by-laws define the manner and means upon which it admits
composers to membership; that no one has an absolute right
to be a member; that it has the sole power to say who shall
belong and who shall not. That refusal to admit plaintiff to
membership is not an invasion of his rights and gives him no
right of action against ASCAP thereby. 5
Trade associations likewise have complete freedom to reject appli-
cants for membership on any grounds whatever. 6 For example, a chamber
of commerce cannot be required to accept anyone who applies, even if he
meets reasonable standards for membership. 7 An exchange is equally
free to accept or reject applicants without restriction on its discretion. 8
In one case involving an advertising agency, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals quoted an American Jurisprudence Annotation and pointed out:
Membership in a voluntary association is a privilege which may
be accorded or withheld and not a right which can be gained
independently and then enforced. The courts cannot compel the
admission of an individual into such an association, and if his
application is refused he is entirely without legal remedy, no
matter how arbitrary or unjust may be his exclusion.69
A cooperative association may also limit its membership arbitrarily,7"
unless because of its franchise it has a statutory duty to admit new sub-
scribers.7 ' Speaking of a telephone association, a New York court ac-
cordingly explained:
privilege, which may be accorded or withheld and not a right which can be gained
independently and enforced. In the absence of breach of the law a chancellor is
powerless to compel admission by or into such an Association and if one's applica-
tion is refused it is equally without power to grant relief.
23 F. Supp. at 699-700.
65. Arnstein v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 29 F. Supp. 388,
393 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
66. See Importers' & Exporters' Ins. Co. v. Rhoades, 209 App. Div. 689, 205 N.Y. Supp.
628 (1924). But see Opinion of the Attorney General of California, No. 62/142, Oct. 30,
1962, 7 RACE REL. L. R. 1320 (1962).
67. Barazani v. Brighton & Manhattan Beach Chamber of Commerce, 20 Misc. 2d 844,
846, 194 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (1959), where the court pointed out: "There is no rule of law
anywhere which gives power to a court to compel a membership corporation or a voluntary
association to accept an applicant as a member of such bodies."
68. W. G. Press & Co. v. Fahy, 313 Ill. 262, 145 N.E. 103 (1924); American Live-Stock
Comm'n Co. v. Chicago Live-Stock Exch., 143 Ill. 210, 233, 32 N.E. 274, 279 (1892) ("a
court of chancery will not undertake to force upon a corporation of this character a member,
against the will of those whose duty it is to pass upon applications for membership.");
Cline v. Insurance Exch., 140 Tex. 175, 180, 166 S.W.2d 677, 680 (1942) ("A voluntary
association has the power to enact rules governing the admission of members and prescribing
certain qualifications for membership .... ").
69. Gold Knob Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Outdoor Advertising Ass'n, 225 S.W.2d 645,
646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
70. Stuttgart Co-op. Buyers Ass'n v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 194 Ark. 779, 109 S.W.2d
682 (1937).
71. See Myers v. Lux, 76 S.D. 182, 75 N.W.2d 533 (1956) (A public service cooperative
engaged in furnishing electricity may be required to admit new members).
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Such membership is a privilege which the association may accord
or withhold at its pleasure, and a court of equity has no juris-
diction to compel the admission of a person not regularly
elected, even though, as in the case of a political organization or
labor union, the arbitrary rejection of the candidate may preju-
dice his material interests.72
IV. MEDICAL SocrETIES
The general rule in the United States has traditionally been that a
voluntary medical society is free to admit or refuse to admit an appli-
cant for membership on whatever grounds it deems justified7 and "ex-
clusion from any selective group of high-standard professionals leaves
the rejected ones without desired kudos and prestige-but no court has
ever taken it on itself to review such selections."74 A California court
has observed that "membership in such an association is not a right that
can be demanded but is a privilege that may be granted or withheld on
the terms and conditions imposed by the association .... ,7 In the same
vein, a federal court held:
The mere fact that the medical society is not merely a social or
fraternal organization, but an active and effective instrumen-
tality benefiting its members, does not necessarily require that
organization to admit to membership any qualified person who
seeks its undeniable benefits. The analogy of the medical society
to a labor union drawn by plaintiff is no doubt apt, but the band-
ing together of persons of common interest in a free society is so
commonly done for almost every conceivable interest that such
united action, in whatever sphere of human activity, can be
classed as characteristic of, rather than repugnant to, a free
72. Branagan v. Buckman, 67 Misc. 242, 122 N.Y.S. 610, 614 (1910), aff'd, 145 App.
Div. 950, 130 N.Y. Supp. 1106 (1911).
73. Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955) ; Tatkin v. Superior Court,
160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 326 P.2d 201 (1958); Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews, 227 Ind.
217, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1949) ; Clark v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc., 121 So.2d 752 (La.
App. 1960); Baltimore County Hosp. v. Maryland Hosp. Serv., 234 Md. 427, 200 A.2d 39
(1964) ; State ex rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medical Soc'y, 97 W. Va. 273, 124 S.E.
826 (1924). In Medical Soc'y v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 136, 16 So.2d 321, 324 (1944), the
court said:
Membership in a voluntary association is a privilege which may be accorded or
withheld, and not a right which can be gained independently and then enforced.
The courts cannot compel the admission of an individual into such an association,
and if his application is refused, he is entirely without legal remedy, no matter how
arbitrary or unjust may be his exclusion.
74. Salter v. New York State Psychological Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250, 253
(1964). In Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068, 1076-77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), the court said:
A voluntary association has the power to enact laws governing the admission of
members and to prescribe the necessary qualifications for membership .... Mem-
bership therein is a privilege which the society may accord or withhold at its
pleasure, with which a court of equity will not interfere, even though the arbitrary
rejection of the candidate may prejudice his material interest.
75. Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 112 P.2d 268, 272 (Cal. App. 1941), aff'd,
19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942). See also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 964 (1963).
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society and free trade .... The alleged economic activity of the
medical associations, though it may have a profound effect upon
other men of the profession as well as upon laymen, is no more
contrary to any law or decision cited or founded by the court
than the same sort of activity of other groups. Nor does the
court find any law or decision requiring such groups to admit
to membership any person who may be as well qualified as the
present membership.7 6
But an exception has been carved in the foregoing rule where the
medical society has the power to license physicians to practice medicine. 7
Thus, it has been held that although a dental society could normally
choose whom it wanted as a member when it has no governmental func-
tions, where by statute it had a voice in the selection of dental examiners,
it became a quasi-governmental agency and had to admit all dentists on
reasonable terms. 78 Accordingly, a federal court held:
Except for the Acts of the Georgia Legislature above quoted,
the Georgia Dental Association and the Northern District
Dental Society would have the undoubted right to admit only
such persons as they desired, and could, without violating any
law, exclude Negroes from membership.79
More recently, several courts have taken the position that where a
medical society does in fact, although not in law, have control over the
practice of medicine in a particular area, it should be treated as a public
utility and not a mere voluntary society and should be required to admit
all applicants who meet reasonable qualifications and standards.80 The
theory behind these cases is that the society has an economic stranglehold
on the profession, 81 which makes it essentially different from a voluntary
76. Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155, 162-63 (W.D. Ark. 1958),
aff'd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). In Hawkins v. North
Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 810 (W.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 355
F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966), the district court said:
An individual is free to choose his associates and voluntary private association of
individuals is free to choose its members. A court will not and cannot compel
admission of an individual into a voluntary association, membership being a privi-
lege and not a right. This is true no matter what may be the reason or the motive
for the denial of membership.
77. People ex rel. Bartless v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. 187 (1865) ; Ewald v. Medical
Soc'y, 144 App. Div. 82, 128 N.Y. Supp. 886 (1911).
78. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
79. Bell v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299, 301 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
80. Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 46 Cal. Reptr. 808, 816 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1965), where the court also said:
As a general rule membership in a voluntary association is a privilege which may be
granted or withheld by the association at its pleasure, not an enforceable right, and the
courts will not interfere to compel admission to membership, no matter how arbitrary or
unjust may be the rejection of the candidate.
81. See Group Health Co-op, v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237
P.2d 737 (1951). Note also Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 HARv. L. REV. 993, 1022-23 (1930); Note, Expulsion and Exclusion from Hospital Practice
and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RuToas L. REv. 327 (1961).
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club or organization. 2 The Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that
"in the light of its virtual monopolistic control of the practice of medi-
cine in the area, the County Society must be dealt with as involuntary
in nature and subject to judicial scrutiny ... "I'
In none of these cases was it suggested that discrimination based
on race, color, or creed alone could be forbidden, and, indeed, all of
these cases dealt with other kinds of discrimination. Because of the mo-
nopolistic control over medical practice, a universal rule was applied
that the society could not arbitrarily discriminate in refusing to admit
applicants. But this rule is exceptional. It does not apply unless there
is an economic domination of the profession.
V. LABOR UNIONS
The earliest case to deal with the right to be admitted to member-
ship in a union treated a labor organization as if it were a private club.
Thus, the New Jersey Chancery Court explained:
[N]o case can, I think be found where the power of any court
has been exercised, as sought in this case, to require the admis-
sion of any person to original membership in any such voluntary
association. Courts exist to protect rights, and where the right
has once attached, they will interfere to prevent its violation;
but no person has any abstract right to be admitted to such
membership. That depends solely upon the action of the
society .... "
Another New Jersey court declared:
It would be quite impractical for the courts to undertake to com-
pel men to receive into their social relationships one who was
personally disagreeable, whether for good or bad reason ...
82. Kurk v. Medical Soc'y, 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1965), reversed on
other grounds, 24 A.D.2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 928, 276 N.Y.S.2d
1007, 223 N.E.2d 499 (1966).
83. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 597, 170 A.2d 791, 795
(1961).
84. Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters Ass'n, 47 N.J.Eq. 519, 20 A. 492, 494 (1890).
See also Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 118 N.J.Eq. 11,
21, 176 A. 692, 697 (1935):
Trade union membership, like other contractual relationships, is purely voluntary on
both sides. Such organizations come into being for purposes mutually agreed upon.
The cohesive force is the common interest. Their right to prescribe qualifications for
membership and to make rules and regulations for the transaction of their lawful
business is not open to question. They may impose such requirements for admission
and such formalities of election as may be deemed fit and proper; they may restrict
membership to the original promoters, or limit the number to be thereafter ad-
mitted; the power of such a body to make its membership exclusive is incident to
its character. The underlying theory of such combinations is association mutually
acceptable, or in accordance with regulations agreed upon. Enforced admission to
membership is manifestly contrary to the scheme of such a society. No person has
an abstract or absolute right to such membership.
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[Courts] cannot, by a mandatory writ, intrude one man's com-
panionship on another. The attempt to do so would be unavail-
ing, as it would lead only to the disintegration of the associa-
tion. 5
For many years, the rule was uniform that labor unions, like other
voluntary associations could arbitrarily reject candidates for member-
ship, and this is still the rule today in a number of jurisdictions.8 In
Massachusetts, it was even held that a union which maintained a closed
shop need not admit all qualified applicants." Federal law did not alter
this rule."' Since unions were able to arbitrarily bar white applicants, the
courts held that they could discriminate on racial grounds and bar Ne-
groes.8 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ex-
plained: "The Brotherhood is a private association whose membership
policies are its own affair. . . .'o The Supreme Court of Wisconsin quoted
an American Jurisprudence Annotation in pointing out:
Like other associations, trade unions may prescribe qualifica-
tions for membership. They may impose such requirements for
admission and such formalities of election as may be deemed
fit and proper. Moreover, they may restrict membership to the
original promoters, or limit the number to be thereafter ad-
mitted. No person has an abstract or absolute right to member-
ship....
Membership in a voluntary association is a privilege, which
may be accorded or withheld, and not a right which can be
85. Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 381, 99 A. 134, 135 (1916).
In Wilson v. Newspaper Union, 123 N.J.Eq. 347, 197 A. 720, 722 (1938), the court remarked
that "A union may restrict its members at pleasure . . . ." Accord, Carroll v. Local 269, 133
N.J.Eq. 144, 145, 31 A.2d 223, 224 (1943): "Our courts do not exercise visitorial powers
over voluntary associations or their proceedings, and that this court has no jurisdiction to
compel the admission of a person, not elected according to the rules and by-laws, to member-
ship in a voluntary association."
86. United Nuclear Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 F.2d 133 (1st Cir. 1965); Moynahan v.
Pari-Mutuel Employees Guild, 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963) ; State ex rel. Givins v. Superior
Court, 233 Ind. 235, 238, 117 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1954) ("Membership in an unincorporated
association ... is a privilege and is neither a civil nor property right") ; Radio Station KFH
Co. v. Musicians Ass'n, 169 Kans. 596, 220 P.2d 199 (1950) ; Thorn v. Foy, 328 Mass. 337,
103 N.E.2d 416 (1952) ; Lowery v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 241 Miss. 458, 467,
130 So.2d 831, 836 (1961) ("It is well-settled law that clubs and societies, including labor
unions, have the right to establish their own rules, and qualifications for membership")
Yeager v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 39 Wash. 2d 807, 239 P.2d 318 (1951).
87. Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677 (1941) ; Maguire v. Buckley, 301
Mass. 355, 17 N.E.2d 170 (1938).
88. Hughes v. Local 11 of Int'l Bridge Workers, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1961).
89. Marshall v. Central of Ga. Ry., 147 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. Ga. 1956); Dillard v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 136 F. Supp. 689, 698 (S.D.W. Va. 1955) ("The unions . ..bar
Negroes from membership. It is true that this ban from membership is not, in itself, illegal.
."); Taylor v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 106 F. Supp. 438 (D.D.C. 1952).
90. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959), where the court held that racial discrimination in member-
ship by a federally certified union does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
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gained independently and then enforced. The courts cannot
compel the admission of an individual into such an association,
and if his application is refused, he is entirely without legal
remedy, no matter how arbitrary or unjust may be this exclu-
sion.
It may be disadvantageous to an individual not to be chosen for
membership in a voluntary association but the courts hitherto
have been powerless to compel the association to receive him.
His exclusion has not been a wrong of which the courts have
cognizance .... 91
The court added:
[w] e find nothing in Wisconsin law denying to a labor union a
legal right to determine the eligibility of its membership, nor can
we find this court charged with a duty, or a right, to compel
such a union to take in applicants who are unacceptable for any
reasons, color among them, and thereby turn voluntary associa-
tions into involuntary ones. 2
However, a number of commentators observed that unions, because
of their economic power, were different from social clubs and fraternal
organizations where questions of sociability were decisive, and should
be required to admit all applicants on reasonable terms.9" California was
the first state to draw this distinction. The rule in that state had originally
been the same as the rule elsewhere; a union could arbitrarily discriminate
in selecting its members. 4 But in the leading case of James v. Marinship
Corp.,"5 decided in 1944, the Supreme Court of California said:
In our opinion, an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union is
incompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this
case, attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of
closed shop agreements and other forms of collective labor ac-
tion, such a union occupies a quasi public position similar to
that of a public service business and it has certain corresponding
obligations. It may no longer claim the same freedom from
legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal associations.
Its asserted right to choose its own members does not merely
relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to
work for a living.96
91. Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315, 317 (1957).
92. Id. at 532, 82 N.W.2d at 320.
93. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1947); Newman,
The Closed Union and The Right to Work, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 42 (1943); Hewitt, The
Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 919 (1951).
94. Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 166, 233 P. 823, 828
(1925): "The fact that one may suffer injury by reason of non-admission to membership in
a voluntary association, affords no ground for relief."
95. 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
96. Id. at 731, 155 P.2d at 335.
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While the foregoing case dealt with racial discrimination, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court soon made clear that any employee's "right to
protection against arbitrary and discriminatory exclusion from union
membership should be recognized wherever membership is a necessary
prerequisite to work."97 The rule that a union could not maintain both
a closed shop and a closed union was applied when white workers were
denied admission arbitrarily for reasons other than those of race, color,
or creed," such as personal friendship, dislike, or favoritism.99 Thus, the
California courts went from a rule giving no protection to a worker who
was arbitrarily refused the right to join a union, to a rule giving all
workers the right to join unions, subject only to reasonable qualifications
for membership, and granting a remedy in all such cases. Thus, applicants
who were arbitrarily refused admission all received equal protection.
Other jurisdictions also altered their law to provide that a union
with a closed shop or union security agreement could not arbitrarily re-
fuse to accept applicants for membership. 10 If a union could not limit
its membership to white workers,'' neither could it give preference to sons
of members." 2 An Ohio court explained:
A union may restrict its membership at pleasure; it may, under
certain conditions, lawfully contract with employers that all
work shall be given to its members. But it cannot do both.'
The experience in New York has been somewhat peculiar. Until the
beginning of World War II, unions in New York were treated like social
clubs, and could decline to admit any applicant for any reason or no
reason. 04 One case noted:
97. Williams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 591, 165 P.2d 903,
906 (1946).
98. Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629,
320 P.2d 494 (1958); Dotson v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 34
Cal. 2d 362, 210 P.2d 5 (1949).
99. See Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Reptr. 710, 409
P.2d 934 (1966).
100. Carroll v. Local 269, 133 N.J.Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223 (1943); Wilson v. Newspaper
Union, 123 N.J.Eq. 347, 197 A. 720 (1938); See also N.L.R.B. v. Hotel Union, 320 F.2d
254 (3d Cir. 1963).
101. See Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
102. See Bryan v. International Alliance, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. App. 1957).
103. Seligman v. Toledo Moving Pictures Operators Union, 88 Ohio App. 137, 98
N.E.2d 54, 59 (1947).
104. Felman v. Fur Dressers' Union, 27 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1941), rev'd, 29 N.Y.S.2d 174
(1941); Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1938). In Simons v. Berry, 210
App. Div. 90, 205 N.Y.S. 442 (1924), rev'd on other grounds, 240 N.Y. 463, 148 N.E. 636
(1925), the Appellate Division said:
There is no rule of law anywhere which gives power to a court to compel a mem-
bership corporation or a voluntary association to accept an applicant as a member
of such bodies, and there is no doubt that defendant was within its legal rights in
rejecting plaintiff's application for membership.
The court added:
Whether to grant or refuse membership in a voluntary association is a matter under
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It is well settled law in this state that a labor organization, being
an unincorporated body, has a right to refuse admission of
members to its ranks and may do so even if such a refusal is
arbitrary .... Membership is a privilege and not a right. The
defendant could have refused membership, limited or unlimited,
to the plaintiff and such refusal could not have been reviewed
by the courts . 105
New York law permitted a union to maintain both an arbitrarily closed
membership and a closed shop. The rule that unions could discriminate
for any reason whatever was applied irrespective of the reason for re-
jection. 6
In 1940 New York passed a statute making it illegal for a union to
refuse membership because of race, color, creed, or national origin.10 7 In
Railway Mail Association v. Corsi 108 the New York Court of Appeals
noted that if the association were not a labor organization, it "would
be free to admit to or exclude from membership such persons as it chose,
for good reason, for bad reason or for no reason.'0 9 But the court found
that the association engaged not only in fraternal activities, but also lob-
bied on behalf of postal workers, its members, for better pay and work-
ing conditions. It therefore held that the group was a labor organization
covered by the act, even though it manifestly could have neither a closed
nor a union shop, since government employment is open to everyone. The
court accordingly applied the statute to a completely voluntary organiza-
tion of federal postal workers having no economic power to shut off jobs.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the New York court in hold-
ing the statute constitutional." 0
The result was a striking anomaly. If a person was discriminated
against by a union because of race, color, religion, or ethnic origin, typi-
cally a Negro, he could obtain relief from the state even where the union
was entirely voluntary and had no economic power over his job. But if
he was a white person discriminated against for other arbitrary reasons,
such as politics or personality, he was utterly helpless, even if, by a
complete control of the organization itself, and the ruling is not subject to review
by the courts.
Id. at 92, 205 N.Y.S. at 445.
105. Shein v. Rose, 12 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1939).
106. In Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1939), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 854, 23
N.Y.S.2d 552 (1940), the Supreme Court declared: "[Tihe court will not decree that the
union shall permit non-union men to be employed where there is an existing 'closed shop'
contract with the employers. Nor will the court compel a union to accept anyone for
membership irrespective of the cause for refusal." Accord, Acierno v. North Shore Bus Co.,
173 Misc. 79, 17 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (1939): "Under the present state of the Law, the court
cannot compel a union to accept anyone for membership, irrespective of the cause for refusal
and even though such refusal may be arbitrary."
107. N.Y. CIvIL RIGHTS LAW, art. 4, § 43 (1940).
108. 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944).
109. Id. at 321, 56 N.E.2d at 724.
110. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
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closed shop, rejection of his application for membership prevented him
from working.
This situation has been only partially alleviated in New York. In
1947, in one case where a union admitted only sons of members, the
Supreme Court declared:
It is undoubtedly the law of this State that the courts have no
control of the membership of labor unions and that persons may
be excluded therefrom without reason other than race, color,
creed, or national origin."'
In a cryptic opinion, which is virtually unintelligible, the Appellate Divi-
sion reversed this holding, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal
without opinion." 2 Lower courts have interpreted this decision to mean
that a closed union cannot also maintain a closed shop. Accordingly, it
was held that a union which admitted only sons of members could not
maintain a union shop. The union would have to choose between a union
shop and reasonable admission standards or a closed union and an open
shop." 3 Thus, a union could not discriminate based on sex, if that were
arbitrary, and it had a closed shop." 4
But if the union does not maintain a closed shop, then aside from
grounds of race, color, creed or national origin, the law in New York
still is that "membership in a labor union, despite its economic impor-
tance ... is still regarded as a privilege which may be granted or with-
held by a union.""' Thus: "It has been the law in this state for many
years that a union cannot be compelled to admit strangers to member-
ship."" 6
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
What is freedom of choice in organizations, and what constitutes
a violation thereof? In this author's opinion, it is a violation of freedom
111. Clark v. Curtis, 71 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (1947).
112. Clark v. Curtis, 273 App. Div. 797, 76 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1014,
80 N.E.2d 536 (1948).
113. Ryan v. Simons, 98 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 277 App. Div.
1000, 100 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1950) ; Kelly v. Simons, 87 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1949).
114. Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1950).
115. Colson v. Gelber, 192 Misc. 520, 80 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (1948). In Feinne v.
Monahan, 196 Misc. 407, 92 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1949), it was held:
The plaintiff . . . complains of his arbitrary exclusion from membership in the
defendant union and his resultant inability to obtain employment at his trade in
the city or vicinity, due to the union's control of employment and the unavailability
of positions to those not members in good standing of the defendant union. He
repeatedly requested the defendant to let him work if it would not admit him to
membership, but the union arbitrarily denied each such application . . ..
Membership in a labor union is a privilege which the law in this state permits a
union to deny, however worthy the applicant and unfortunate his economic plight
because of his exclusion .... In the final analysis the sole grievance is the refusal
to admit the plaintiff to membership. The law does not regard such refusal as
actionable.
116. Ryan v. Simons, supra note 113, at 252.
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of choice and association for any private organization, club or society
to elect to membership, or otherwise to extend any privileges or facilities
to any person, in violation of its constitution or by-laws, over the ob-
jection of any member who insists upon the restriction in the constitution
or by-laws. The member may have joined in reliance on the provision not
being violated, and is entitled to insist on the restriction unless it is
changed in the manner set out for its amendment.
It is likewise a violation of freedom of choice for a group to elect to
membership or otherwise grant to any person facilities or privileges,
either over the objection of a parent group or one with which the club
is affiliated, in violation of its constitution or by-laws, or that of the
parent or affiliated group. The reason for this is that the parent group
may have chartered the chapter, or the affiliated group may have made
the affiliation, in reliance on the membership restriction which has been
violated, and they should be entitled to insist on the benefits or condi-
tions of their recognition of the local group. It is equally a denial of
freedom of choice for a group to elect to membership any person, in
violation of its established practices, over the objection of a majority
of its members, although this is only likely to occur through outside
pressure.
Finally, it is a denial of freedom of choice to require any person to
join any private organization which contains as members any person he
chooses not to associate with. And it is even a greater denial of freedom
of choice for any governmental agency or private institution, such as
a business corporation or university, to require any organization to com-
mit an infringement on freedom of choice.
If there were no Negroes in the United States it is doubtful that
anyone would quarrel with the foregoing principles. They are certainly
in accordance with the common-law as it has developed regarding clubs
and societies in the United States. It is true that very recently medical
societies and labor unions which have obtained economic monopolies
have been treated as public utilities and required to admit all applicants
on reasonable terms." 7 But these are essentially different from voluntary
organizations, as has been pointed out. One case explained:
Certain conduct, which might not justify expulsion from some
other type of association, where membership is a condition to
earning a livelihood, or essential to the enjoyment of a contract
or property right, may justify expulsion from a private social
club, which usually has the primary purpose of affording pleas-
117. See Avins, Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Housing: A Denial of Freedom of
Choice, OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FORCED HOUSING UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3, 8-10
(Avins ed. 1963).
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ant, friendly, and congenial social relationship and association
between the members.118
In respect to organizations which do not have economic monopolies,
it has never been suggested that the right to admit or refuse members
arbitrarily be curtailed, except in respect to race, color, creed, or ethnic
origin. But the Constitution of the United States was not created espe-
cially for people discriminated against on these grounds. It was created
equally for all people, and when a state bans some types of arbitrary
discrimination and permits all others assuming such discrimination is
arbitrary), it is clearly not an enforcement of equal protection of the
laws; rather, it is a denial of equal protection." 9 It is simply an example
of special privileges for the favored groups who are given a legal remedy
while all other persons discriminated against have no remedy.
But discrimination in selection for private clubs and societies is not
arbitrary. Rather, it is the very essence of the group. No better illustra-
tion of this fact can be found than the recent recognition by City College
of New York of its first Negro fraternity 2 ° and its first Negro sorority.' 2'
If Negroes object to exclusive, social relations and crave integrated clubs,
they are perfectly free to combine with like-minded white persons to form
inter-racial clubs. For example, a suburb of New York City recently
granted a permit for an inter-racial golf and country club headed by
Jackie Robinson, the former Brooklyn Dodger.'22 Judge Wilkin, for the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, has put the
matter very well, saying:
People of any race, religion, or political faith may assemble and
118. Waugaman v. Skyline Country Club, 277 Ala. 495, 172 So.2d 381, 382 (1965).
In State ex rel. Barfield v. Florida Yacht Club, 106 So.2d 207, 209-10 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958),
the court said:
There is a valid distinction between those institutions such as trade unions, pro-
fessional associations or trading exchanges and like organizations, affecting a person's
right to earn a living on the one hand, and private social clubs on the other. Certain
conduct, which might not justify expulsion from some other type of association,
where membership is a condition to earning a livelihood, or essential to the enjoy-
ment of a contract or property right, may justify expulsion from a private social
club.
The principles announced in the cases in which the courts have intervened to
protect a person from unreasonable expulsion from a trade union or professional
society or organization do not and should not control with respect to a private
social club.
The primary, if not the only, interest and purpose of a private social club is to
afford pleasant, friendly and congenial social relationship and association between
the members.
119. Avins, Fourteenth Amendment Limitations on Banning Racial and Religious
Discriminations: The Original Understanding, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, on S. 3296 (Civil Rights), 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 805 (1966).
120. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1965, at 19, col. 4.
121. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1966, at 22, col. 7.
122. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1966, at 20, col. 3. For a similar club in Philadelphia, see
N.Y. Times, March 5, 1967, at 21, col. 1.
1967]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
associate for the advancement of their interests. No sound pub-
lic policy would destroy the interesting diversity of life. If the
aim and end of democracy should be to reduce all men to the
same shape and shade and common opinion, then it could not
and should not survive. It would counter one of the fundamental
principles of evolution.
It is apparent to any person of fair mind that, if the defendant
Association wishes to represent and to speak for all the lawyers
of the District, then in all fairness it ought to make all lawyers
eligible for membership. If it does not do so, then members of
the bar who champion the proposed amendment ought to unite
with other members of like mind and organize an all-inclusive
bar association for the District which would be authorized to
speak and act for all persons admitted to practice before the
United States District Court.
The defendant Association, for a long time, has restricted its
membership, and some of its members emphasize that object and
purpose of the Association which is "to increase the mutual im-
provement and social intercourse of its members." If they feel
that the social purposes of a limited membership are of more
importance than being the agency of the entire bar of the Dis-
trict, their wishes and desires should not be overridden or denied
except by action of the Association taken in accordance with
the By-Laws. 2'
123. Goshorn v. Bar Ass'n, 152 F. Supp. 300, 306 (D.D.C. 1957).
